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Case No. 7970 
IN THE S·UPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of FLORENCE 
P. HOWARD, also known as F 1• P. 
HOWARD, D-eceased. 
NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, LT·D., 
as Administrator with the Will Annexed 
of the Estate of Robert Bown Ferrie, De-
ceased, and COLINA FERRIE, 
Petitioners in Intervention 
and App·ellarnts, 
-vs.-
HELEN DUYS, ETHEL FORREST, 
ERNEST F. HOWARD, THE PROTE·S-
TANT BOARD OF SCHOOL COMMIS-
SIONERS and McGILL UNIVER:SITY, 
MILDRED BLACK, HILDA BLACK, 
ROGER BLACK, RACHEL HELPS. and 
WALKER BANK & TRUS·T COMPANY, 
a Utah Banking corporation, Executor of 
the Estate .o:f Florence P. Howard, also 
knotwn as F. P. Howard, Deceased, 
Respondents. 
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IN THE S·UPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the ~Iat.ter of the Estate of F·LORENCE 
P. HO\\"'" ARD, also known as F'. P. 
I-IO\'r ARD, D-e.ce:ased. 
~-A.TIONAL TRUST COMPANY, LTD., 
as Administrator with the Will Annexed 
of the Estate of Robert Bown Ferrie, De-
ceased, and COLINA FERRIE, 
Petitioners in Intervention 
and Appellants, 
-vs.-
HELEN Dl"TYS, ETHEL FORREST, 
ERNEST F. HOWARD, THE PROTE·s-
TANT BOARD OF SCHOOL COMMIS-
SIONERS and McGILL UNIVERSITY, 
MILDRED BLACK, HILDA BLACK, 
ROGER BLACK, RACHEL HELPS and 
vV ALKER BANK & TRUS·T COMPANY, 
a Utah B·anking corporation, Exeeutor ·of 
the Estate of Florence P. Howard, also 




REPLY BRIEF OF' CONTESTANT RES.POND·ENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
In ans·wering the Brief of Appellants on Inter-
mediate Appeal, represented by Mr. Rice and associates, 
we shall in order to avoid confusion, refer to such Appel-
lants· as Intervenors. This being the answe·ring Brief of 
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the original Cnntestants, Helen Duys, Ethel Forrest and 
Ernest F. Howard, we will denominate it the Contestants' 
answering Brief, and are authorized to state that Gustin, 
R'ichards and Mattsson and Fred H. Evans, representing 
Respondents, The Protestant Board of School Colllluis-
sioners and McGill University, j'Oin in this Brief. As to 
point I of Intervenors' Brief, we make no comment, since 
that is more properly the responsibility of the attorneys 
for the Executor. 
POINTS II AND III - INTERVENORS' BRIEF 
We discuss jo:intly points II and III; since they in-
volve but one question, namely, the right to intervene 
on the 'basis attempted. 
May it be kept in 1nind that on May 14, 1952, the 
Court admitted to prohate four instruments as constitut-
ing the Last Will and Testament of Decedent (R. 33). 
On Nove1nher 12 and within the six months period allo\\'-
ed hy law, these Contestants filed contest attacking the 
validity of the orde·r admitting to probate the instru-
ments of 1939 and 1940 (R. 131). Therefore, on N ovenl-
ber 15 when the s'ix months limitation had expired, the 
order admitting to probate the 1949 and 1952 instrtm1ents 
became final and uncontestable, and they togethPr enn-
stituted the Last Will of decedent if Contestants "·erP 
successful in their position. Otherwise, the order \vas 
final as to all four instruments, and they together ('On-
stituted the Last Will. Thereafter, on or about Decenl'her 
6, Mildred Black, on 'behalf of herself, heT brother and 
t'vo sisters, filed an instrument denominated HAppear-
ance and Ans,ver" (R. 62). It i·s an inartificially dra\\·n 
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dootunent, probably prepared by herself and constitutes 
in its "rording more of an attempt to render an opinion 
as to the Testatrix's intention. In any event, we assume 
it should be considered an answer to the will contest 
and in response to the citation served on these parties 
when the contest w·as initiated. In no event can it be a 
eontest as to the 1949 and 1952 instruments since the 
order of the court in relation to these had already become 
final Intervenors and the Blacks occup·y the same posi-
tion so far as the starting of a new will contest is in-
volved. 
On January 14, 1953, Intervenors filed a Motion to 
Intervene on the basis of an "Answer and Cross Com-
plaint in Intervention" filed concurrently (R. 141, 162). 
The first part of this instrument constitutes an ans"\ver 
to the contest, and as such, could p·roperly have been 
filed 'by any interested party without any order of court 
except as to its l~ateness, as to which no question was 
raised :and except as it attacked a Court order already 
final. 
However, Intervenors did not choose to do this. By 
tying the two together and makling a Motion to Intervene 
in order to start a new will contest after the period of 
limitations had run, they S'ought to do indirectly what 
they obviously could not do directly. 
Their motive is obvious. If they could throw out all 
four instruments, the-y, as cousins once removed, would 
inherit. If they could throw out ail except that of 1952, 
which contained no residuary clause, they would at least 
come in :for the resi·due. It did them no good to go along 
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with the timely contest, since the order aillnitting to prO-
bate the 1949 and 1952 wills, now final, disposed of Mrs. 
How~ard's estate. 
May we emphasize that Intervenors had no interest 
\Vhatever in the contest before the court. They "~anted to 
start a new contest, and instead of saying so, which 'vould 
have made the impossi~bility of their position obvious, 
they attempted to come in as parties in the pending con-
test. When, most properly, not permitted to do so under 
the instrument they proffered, they now take the posi-
tion that any interested party may intervene in a pending 
action. Assuming Intervenors had filed an answer to the 
contest, as they properly might, and then atten1pted to 
intervene under their cross complaint, the defect would 
have 'been obvious. They would have been in court as to 
the pending conte:st. They would have been out as to the 
cross complaint on the ground that they were starting 
a will contest attacking an order of the court, which was 
absolutely final. Having joined the two to serve their 
purpose, they are hoist by their own petard and now 
complain that they had no day in court to pursue, their 
objective of att1acking the 1949 and 1952 instruments. 
Utah decisions at least slant at this question in the rases 
of 
Dayton v. Free, 162 Pac. 614, 49 Ut. 221 ~ 
and 
Price v. Hanson, 206 Pac. :272, 60 lJt. 29. 
They there indicate that the question presented is as to 
whether the petitioning Intervenors could have started 
a lawsuit of their O\Vn along the lines sought by inter-
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vention. Certainly, on January 1-+, 1953, petitioning 
Intervenors eould not have started any such lawsuit of 
their own, nor 1nay they rlaiin the benefit of one already 
~tarted, because they ·are seeking something entirely 
different. In other '\vords, there is no community of in-
terest. 
Utah Oode Annotated 1953, 75-3-12 provides in its 
pertinent 'vording, 
··~~ny perS'on who has not contested a will* * * 
n1ay eontest the sru:ne or the p~rohate thereof at 
any tiine 'vithin six months after the admission to 
probate and not afterw~ards * * *" 
What is a will eontest~ Bancro£t's Probate Practice, 
Volu1ne 1, page 395 says it appears to be, in usual parli-
ance, merely a designation of any kind of a litigated 
controversy concerning the eligrbility of an instrument 
to probate. That very properly covers exactly what C:on-
testants had done within the tin1e pe·rmitted by law as. 
to the 1939 and 1940 instruments. It also covers exactly 
what Intervenors were attempting to do, beyond the time 
permitted by law, as to the 1949 and 1952 instruments. 
The New Mexico court, in the case of 
In Re Martinez' Will, 132 Pac. 2d 422, 
says in substance that the right to contest ·a will is not a 
common law right, but a right conferred s'olely by stat-
ute, which should he strictly construed; that it is a new 
and independent action, the right to prosecute which 
eannot accrue until there has been an order admitting 
the will to probate. 
The Kansas court in the case of 
Pownall v. Connell, 122 Pac. 2d 730, 
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holds that any cause of action which a pleader can set 
down on pap·er which, if established, would necessarily 
render a will nugatory is a "will contest", and must be 
brought within the time permitted by statute for will con-
tests. 
The Arizona court, in 
In Re Hesse's Estate, 157 Pac. 2d 347 
lrolds that a "will contest" is any kind of a litigated con-
troversy concerning the eligibility of an instrument to 
probate, as distinguished from the validity ·of the con-
tents of the will. 
We have, perhaps unduly, supported with authority 
what may appear to the court an ·obvious definition, but 
we do 'vish to make douhly clear that what Intervenors 
were attempting to do, both in their Answer and Cross 
Complaint, was to start a new ''contest". As previously 
stated, there could have 'been no possible objection to 
Intervenors filing such answer to the contest as they de-
sired, j·oining with the ~ontestants if they \vished, or 
opposing them if they preferred, so long as they did not 
attempt under such guise to bring in a cause of action as 
to which the statute of limitations had already run. 
There is no quarrel with Intervenors' authorities as 
to the right to intervene in general or in particul·ar. The 
sole question here presented is whether, under the gui~e 
of intervention, these parties may start a lawsuit of their 
own. The general rules as to right to intervene, so long 
as the Intervenor comes within the issues of the pend-
ing case, are perfectly clear. Intervenors' quotation fron1 
2 Bancroft's Code Practice and Remedies, pag-e 1139 ,,·ell 
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covers the situation. .A.8 there stated, intervention will 
not as a rule be allowed when it will retard the p-rincipal 
suit, or delay the trial, or change the position of the ori-
ginal parties, or the form of the action or issues. We be-
lieve it :rrray 'be safely said that Intervenors' p·osition flies 
in the face of all these prohibitions. They wanted t:o 
start the contest all over, call witnesses (what they ex-
pected to learn they did n'ot say), delay the entire pro-
ceeding, and change the issues to ·attack admission to pro-
bate of the 1949 and 1952 instruments, which order had 
never been questinned within the time allowed by law. 
Bancroft says, at page 1139, 
"it is sufficient that the ultimate issue to be de-
termined remains the same." 
By any S'tretch of the in1agination did Intervenors bring 
thernselves within this requirement~ They quote fron1 
the Colorado case of 
Cache LaPoudre Irrigation Company v. 
Hawley, 95 Pac. 317, 
in "\vhich the court says the questi~on to be determined is 
whether or not "the intervenor has injected a ne'v issue 
into the case in which he is allowed to intervene." In 
other words, does the ultimate issue to he deteTmined 
remain the same~ Counsel attempted to avoid this ob-
vious proh~bition by contending th-a.t the ultimate ques-
tion, that is issue, is as to whom the propeTty of Florence 
P. H~oward should be distributed. But this is not an ac-
tion to construe a will. It is a statutory contest subject to 
statutory limitatinns. If attacking the final order of the 
court admitting certain instruments to probate, which 
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had ~ever there·tofore been attacked, was not ra1srng 
a completely new issue, and that after the time had ex-
pired, it would be difficult to imagine such a case. 
The right to intervene and be saved from the bar 
of the statute of limitations depends on whether there is 
a community of interest or privity of estate between the 
would-be Intervenor ·and the party who colillnenced the 
action within the statutory time. 
34 Am. J ur. 225-6 ; 
Rockwell v. Junction City, 141 Pac. :299 
(Kan.) 
In the instant case, the positi'on ~aken by the Intervenors 
is exactly opposed that taken by Contestants. Instead of 
there being a community of interest, Intervenors are 
see·king to throw Contestants out completely. Their posi-
tions are fundamentally and wholly inconsistent. Inter-
venors cite the Kansas case of 
Weichold v. Day, 236 Pac. 649, 
which they indicate is an Oklahoma case. That case 
quotes with approval the trail blazing l{ansas rase of 
Maurier v. Miller, 93 Pac. 596. 
in this field. In the W eich'old case, the Intervenors 
sought to do exactly what the Contestants were atteinpt-
ing to do; that is, have set aside the order of the court 
admitting to probate a particular testa1nentary instru-
ment, not to start a new and entirely antagonistic lawsuit. 
The requirement for contest within six months i~ 
1nore than a mere limitati·on of action. It provides a con-
dition upon which the cause of action itself ceases to ex-
ist after the prescribed period. 
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Woodruff v. £t.lorville, 107 N.E. 2d 911 (Oh.). 
The purpose of the conditi·on or limitation is to ac-
c.elerate the s~ttlement of estates. 
Weese v. Weese, 58 S.E. 2d 801 (W. \Ta.) 
\Vhere 'vill eontest was not filed until the last day of 
limitation and the petition so filed was insufficient to in-
voke the jurisdiction of the court, the court was there .. 
after without jurisdiction to authorize contestants to 
amend the petition supplying the necessary averments. 
Vought v. Hall, 225 Pac. 2d 822, (Okla.). 
There is a conflict of authority as to whether a party 
1nay intervene in a "within time" will contest, when th~ 
period of limitation has expired. The more ltberal rule, 
'vith which we have no slightest quarrel, permits such 
intervention. The question generally arises when the 
orig·inal Contestant attempts to dismiss his contest over 
the objections of the Intervenor, and it is held that the 
Intervenor may continue the contest, but all this assumes 
that he had a right to intervene, and that brings us hack 
to the basic condition. When he intervenes, he must take 
the contest as he finds it. He cannot start a new l1awsuit. 
Cases cited by Intervenors completely substantiate this 
position, and it is entirely in keeping with the general 
rules as to intervention. Intervenors cite the early Kan-
sas case of 
Maurier v. Miller, supra 
In that case, the Kansas court, speaking of the rights of 
the C1ontestants to dismiss and the rights of the Inter-
venor to continue the ~action, says at page 597-8, 
"Pending the final determination, he" (the 
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contestant) "may see fit to abandon the sUit, or 
he may be found to have no right to maintain it 
for the reas·on that he is estopped by having ac-
cepted under the will, or soine othe-r obstacle 1nay 
stand in the way of his maintaining the suit; but, 
if the grounds for setting aside the will alleged 
in his petition are established, the intervenor may 
upon the same grounds maintain the action. The 
intervenor takes the suit as he finds it. He is n-ot 
permitted to change the form of the action or the 
issues, or to raise a new one." (Italics supplied.) 
Intervenors likewise cite 
In Re Butzow's Estate, 68 Pac. 2d 374 (Cal.) 
Again, we accept Intervenors' authority. Ennis was the 
ContestJant. The eourt says : 
"Appellant, by her petition or con1plaint, 
sought to join in the con test. She also alleged 
substantially the same grounds of contest as those 
contained in the Ennis ple·ading." 
The court holds, and we feel rightly, that she h'ad a right 
to intervene, even though the time had run as to her, be-
cause she t'Ook the suit as she found it. 
Again, we accept Intervenors' citation of authority 
in the Califiornia CJase of 
Voyce v. Superior Court, 127 Pac. 2d 536. 
Again the Californ'ia court holds that the Contestant may 
not dismiss over the objections of the Intervenor, but 
again the court repeatedly adve-rts to the fact that the 
Intervenor took the case as he found it. At page 540, the 
court says: 
"The right to file a petition in intervention 
under the circmnstances present here \Vas not 
barred by re-ason of the fact that it was not filed 
10 
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\vi thin six months after probate; there was a will 
contest pending, which was filed in time ood no 
t~ttempt was made to raise new grounds of con-
test." (Italics supplied.) 
~£\.gain the Court says on page 541, 
"Prior to that dismissal the court had juris-
diction of the subject matter; th!at is, a contest of 
the will on the grounds stated in the contest, and 
the intervention was filed prior to the dismissal, 
claiming the identical relief involved in the contest 
then before the court." 
and again, 
"In the case at bar no new issues, that is, 
grounds of contest have been raised, and no pTe·ju-
dice has been suffered by petitioners." 
.. and again, 
"In the case at bar no new issues are raised, 
the issues are identical, that is, the validity of the 
\vill with reference to the specific grounds of at-
tack. It is not the purpose of the contest to deter-
mine heirship, or the rights as between the con-
testants to the assets of the estate, but the validity 
of the will is the only issue." 
In a later Calif orni'a case, 
In Re Walters' Estate, 202 Pac. 2d 89, 
the eourt discusses the same question. In this case con-
testants had dismissed their action wherein Appellant 
had not obtained the right to intervene. The Court, on 
page 90, summarizes the remedies originally open to him 
as follows: 
"As far as app.ellant's rights are concerned, it 
is clear that he coui'd have pursued any one of 
three recognized methods of contesting this will. 
He could h'ave filed a contest (1) before p-rohate 
(Sec. 370, Pro. c~ode), or (2) within six months 
11 
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after probate (id. 380) as did Crann, or (3) he 
could have 'become a party to the Crann contest 
hy intervening therein pursuant to sec. 387, Code 
Civ. Proc., even after the six months had run, his 
grounds having been the sanle as those in the ba._~oo·ic 
contest." (Italics supplied.) 
INTERVENORS' POINT IV 
Intervenors cl'aim they had reasonable cause to be-
lieve they would be successful if permitted to interYene. 
In fairness, we must assrune that every litigant \vho 
starts 1an action or attempts to come into one already 
started would make the same claim. Suffice it to say 
that Intervenors' good faith is not an issue in the matter 
before the c~ourt. In the first place, it has not, so far as 
we know, been questioned, and in any event would be 
irnmate!rial 
Intervenors are simply atte1npting, under another 
guise, to argue the case they presumably would haYe 
presented had they been permitted by the Trial C~ourt 
to contest the validity of the 1949 and 1952 instruments. 
The law, we believe, does not in any way suhstanti~ate 
their position under statutes such as ours, but this issue 
has no part in the pending appeal, and we refrain fron1 
a by-path excursion. We cannot imagine a method of 
more completely disregar·ding Mrs. Howard's evidenced 
intentions, than to distribute her estate to cousins once 
removed, whom she had never 1nentioned in any of hPr 
four testamentary instruments. 
INTERVENORS' POINT V 
Intervenors have given but brief attention to the 
portion of the court's judgment dis1nissing their Cro~s 
12 
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Complaint in Intervention (R. 247, 249). We commend 
their brevity and wili follo'v their e2eample. 
All the c'Ourt did \Vas to dismiss this attempted new 
action, and 'vhether that order re1nains as a part of the 
Decree appears immaterial so far as we are concerned. 
The matter of their right to intervene is before this court 
on Intermediate Appeal. The decision of the court will 
control the entire matter, and Intervenors' rights can he 
in no manner prejudiced by the findings or order in ques-
tion. F'in'ally, the judgment in the will contest is not be-
fore this Court on an intermediate appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, as to the correctness of the Trial Court's 
order denying the motion to intervene, may we say that 
Intervenors have cited no authority giving them the right 
to enter the lists with a different contest after the time 
for contest has expired. The authorities cited by them 
fully substantiate Contestants' position that they must 
take the suit as they find it. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BEVERLY S. CLENDENIN and 
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MOFFAT 
& MABEY, 
Attorneys for Contestant Respond-
ents I-Ielen Duys, Ethel Forrest and 
Ernest F. H·oward. 
HARLEY W. GUSTIN, 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & 
MATTSS.ON and FRED H. EVANS, 
Attorneys for Respondents, Pro-
testant Board of School Com.mis-
sioners and McGill University. 
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